La bibliographie sur le Dilemme Itéré des Prisonniers de SMAC


Cette page est générée automatiquement avec une version personnalisé de bib2html.
Le fichier BIB-TeX original utilisé pour générer cette page est disponible ici.
Nous avons une copie de chaque références citées ci-dessous.


76 references, last updated Tue Mar 16 16:46:28 MET 1999

[1]
A. Albert, editor. Chaos and Society, volume 29 of Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications. IOS Press/Presses de l'Université du Québec, Amsterdam, Netherlands, 1995. Chaos & Society 1994, Trois Rivières, Canada, June 1-2 1994.

[2]
P. J. Angeline. An alternate interpretation of the iterated prisoner's dilemma and the evolution of non-mutual cooperation. In Brooks and Maes [16], pages 350-352. Artificial Life 4, Cambridge, MA, USA, July 6-8 1994.

[3]
D. Ashlock, M. D. Smucker, E. Ann Stanley, and L. Tesfatsion. Preferential partner selection in an evolutionnary study of prisoner's dilemma. Economics R. No 35, Submitted for publication, 1994.

[4]
R. Axelrod and D. Dion. The further evolution of cooperation. Science, 242:1385-1390, 1988.

[5]
R. Axelrod and W. D. Hamilton. The evolution of cooperation. Science, 211:1390-1396, 1981.

[6]
R. Axelrod. The Evolution of Cooperation. Basic Books, New York, USA, 1984.

[7]
R. Axelrod. The evolution of strategies in the iterated prisoner's dilemma. In L. Davis, editor, Genetic Algorithms and the Simulated Annealing, chapter 3, pages 32-41. Pitman, London, UK, 1987.

[8]
R. Axelrod. Donnant donnant : théorie du comportement coopératif. Éditions Odile Jacob, Paris, France, 1992. Traduction française de [6].

[9]
S. Bankes. Exploring the foundations of artificial societies. In Brooks and Maes [16], pages 337-342. Artificial Life 4, Cambridge, MA, USA, July 6-8 1994.

[10]
J. Batali and P. Kitcher. Evolutionary dynamics of altruistic behavior in optional and compulsory versions of the iterated prisoner's dilemma. In Brooks and Maes [16], pages 344-348. Artificial Life 4, Cambridge, MA, USA, July 6-8 1994.

[11]
B. Beaufils, J. P. Delahaye, and P. Mathieu. Our meeting with gradual, a good strategy for the iterated prisoner's dilemma. In Langton and Shimohara [44], pages 202-209. Artificial Life 5, Nara, Japan, May 16-18 1996. (Gzipped PostScript, 8 pages, 52981 bytes)

[12]
Bruno Beaufils, Jean-Paul Delahaye, and Philippe Mathieu. Complete classes of strategies for the classical iterated prisoner's dilemma. In V. W. Porto, N. Saravanan, D. Waagen, and A. E. Eiben, editors, Evolutionnary Programming VII, volume 1447 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 33-41, Berlin, 1998. Springer-Verlag. Evolutionnary Programing VII, San Diego, CA, USA, March 25-27, 1998. (Gzipped PostScript, 9 pages, 42479 bytes)

[13]
Bruno Beaufils. Classes complètes de stratégies pour le dilemme itéré des prisonniers classique. In Journées Jeunes Chercheurs Ganymède, pages 36-41, mai 1998. 28 mai 1998.

[14]
J. Bendor. In good times and bad: Reciprocity in an uncertain world. American J. of Political Science, 31:531-558, 1987.

[15]
Robert Boyd and Jeffrey P. Loberbaum. No pure strategy is evolutionarily stable in the repeated prisoner's dilemma game. Nature, 327:58-59, 1987.

[16]
R. A. Brooks and P. Maes, editors. Artificial Life IV: Proceedings of the Fourth International Workshop on the Synthesis and Simulation of Living Systems. A Bradford Book/The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, USA, 1994. Artificial Life 4, Cambridge, MA, USA, July 6-8 1994.

[17]
P. A. Danielson. Evolving artificial moralities: Genetic strategies, spontaneous orders, and moral catastrophe. In Albert [1], pages 293-308. Chaos & Society 1994, Trois Rivières, Canada, June 1-2 1994.

[18]
Richard Dawkins. The Selfish Gene. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, second edition, 1989.

[19]
Richard Dawkins. Le g^ene ego iste . Éditions Colin, Paris, France, 1990. Traduction française de [18].

[20]
J. P. Delahaye and P. Mathieu. Expériences sur le dilemme itéré des prisonniers. Publication Interne IT-233, Laboratoire d'Informatique Fondamentale de Lille, Lille, France, 1992.

[21]
J. P. Delahaye and P. Mathieu. L'altruisme perfectionné. Pour La Science (French Edition of Scientific American), 187:102-107, 1993.

[22]
J. P. Delahaye and P. Mathieu. L'altruisme perfectionné. Publication Interne IT-249, Laboratoire d'Informatique Fondamentale de Lille, Lille, France, 1993.

[23]
J. P. Delahaye and P. Mathieu. Complex strategies in the iterated prisoner's dilemma. In Albert [1], pages 283-292. Chaos & Society 1994, Trois Rivières, Canada, June 1-2 1994.

[24]
J. P. Delahaye and P. Mathieu. Etude sur les dynamiques du dilemme itéré des prisonniers avec un petit nombre de stratégies : Y a-t-il du chaos dans le dilemme pur ? Publication Interne IT-294, Laboratoire d'Informatique Fondamentale de Lille, Lille, France, 1996.

[25]
J. P. Delahaye and P. Mathieu. The iterated lift dilemma or how to establish meta-cooperation with your opponent ? In Lemieux [49]. Complexity, Society and Liberty Conference, Trois-Rivières, Canada, June 11-12 1996, http://www.uqtr.uquebec.ca/complexity/.

[26]
J. P. Delahaye and P. Mathieu. Le monde agité de la coopération. Pour La Science (French Edition of Scientific American), 227, Septembre 1996.

[27]
J. P. Delahaye and P. Mathieu. Random strategies in a two levels iterated prisoner's dilemma : How to avoid conflicts ? In H. J. Múller and R. Dieng, editors, Proceedings of the ECAI 96 Workshop: Modelling Conflicts in AI, pages 68-72. European Coordinating Committee for Artificial Intelligence, 1996. ECAI'96, Budapest, Hungary, August 11-16 1996, Workshop W24.

[28]
J. P. Delahaye. L'altruisme récompensé ? Pour La Science (French Edition of Scientific American), 181:150-156, 1992.

[29]
J. P. Delahaye. Logique, informatique et paradoxes. Éditions Belin, Paris, France, 1995. Bibliothèque Pour La Science.

[30]
P. S. Fader and J. Hauser. Implicit coalitions in the generalized prisoner's dilemma. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 32(3):553-582, 1988.

[31]
M. W. Feldman and E. A. C. Thomas. Behavior-dependant context for repeated plays of the prisoner's dilemma ii: Dynamical aspects of the evolution of cooperation. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 128:297-315, 1987.

[32]
Merill M. Flood. Some experimental games. Research memorandum RM-789-1-PR, RAND Corporation, Santa-Monica, CA, USA, June 1952.

[33]
M. R. Frean. The prisoner's dilemma without synchrony. Proc. Royal Society London, 257(B):75-79, 1994.

[34]
Marcus Frean. The evolution of cooperation. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 182:549-559, 1996. (Gzipped PostScript, 27 pages, 84042 bytes)

[35]
H. C. J. Godfray. The evolution of forgiveness. Nature, 355:206-207, 1992.

[36]
S. G. Gould. Wonderful Life. W. W. Norton, 1989.

[37]
Melvin J. Guyer and Anatol Rapoport. A taxonomy of 2x2 games. General Systems, 11:203-214, 1966.

[38]
D. R. Hofstader. Ma thémagie. InterEditions, Paris, France, 1988. Traduction française de [40].

[39]
D. R. Hofstadter. The prisoner's dilemma computer tournaments and the evolution of cooperation. Scientific American, 248:16-26, May 1983.

[40]
D. R. Hofstadter. Metamagical Themas: Questing for the Essence of Mind and Patterns. Bantam Books, New York, USA, 1986.

[41]
P. Jaisson. La fourmi et le sociobiologiste. Editions Odile Jacob, Paris, France, 1993.

[42]
N. V. Joshi. Evolution of cooperation by reciprocation within structured demes. Journal of Genetics, 66(1):69-84, 1987.

[43]
Laurent Ladrière. Algorithmes génétiques et dilemme itéré des prisonniers. Mémoire de dea, Laboratoire d'Informatique Fondamentale de Lille, Lille, France, 1994.

[44]
Christopher G. Langton and Katsunori Shimohara, editors. Proceedings of Artificial Life V. The MIT Press/Bradford Books, Cambridge, MA, USA, 1996. Artificial Life 5, Nara, Japan, May 16-18 1996.

[45]
Christopher G. Langton, Charles Taylor, J. Doyne Farmer, and Steen Rasmussen, editors. Artificial Life II: Proceedings of the Second Interdisciplinary Workshop on the Synthesis and Simulation of Living Systems, volume 10 of Santa Fe Institute Studies in the Sciences of Complexity. Addisson-Wesley Publishing Company, Reading, MA, USA, 1992. Artificial Life 2, Santa Fe, USA, February 1990.

[46]
Christopher G. Langton, editor. Artificial Life: The Proceedings of an Interdisciplinary Workshop on the Synthesis and Simulation of Living Systems, volume 6 of Santa Fe Institute Studies in the Sciences of Complexity. Addisson-Wesley Publishing Company, Reading, MA, USA, 1989. Artificial Life, Los Alamos, USA, September 1987.

[47]
Christopher G. Langton, editor. Artificial Life III: Proceedings of the Third Interdisciplinary Workshop on the Synthesis and Simulation of Living Systems, volume 17 of Santa Fe Institute Studies in the Sciences of Complexity. Addisson-Wesley Publishing Company, Reading, MA, USA, 1994. Artificial Life 3, Santa Fe, USA, June 1992.

[48]
P. Lemieux. Chaos et anarchie. In Albert [1], pages 211-238. Chaos & Society 1994, Trois Rivières, Canada, June 1-2 1994.

[49]
P. Lemieux, editor. Complexity, Society and Liberty. 1996. Complexity, Society and Liberty Conference, Trois-Rivières, Canada, June 11-12 1996, http://www.uqtr.uquebec.ca/complexity/.

[50]
K. Lindgren and M. G. Nordhal. Cooperation and community structure in artificial ecosystems. In C. G. Langton, editor, Artificial Life, An Overview, pages 15-37. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, USA, 1995.

[51]
K. Lindgren. Evolutionary phenomena in simple dynamics. In Langton et al. [45], pages 295-312. Artificial Life 2, Santa Fe, USA, February 1990.

[52]
E. Mackaay. L'ordre spontané comme fondement du droit - un survol de l'émergence des règles dans la société civile. Revue Internationale de Droit Economique, 3:247-287, 1989.

[53]
C. Martino. Emergent nastiness in iterated prisoner's dilemma games. 2.725: Design and Automation, 1995.

[54]
R. M. May. More evolution of cooperation. Nature, 327:15-17, 1987.

[55]
J. H. Miller. The coevolution of automata in the repeated prisoner's dilemma. Working Paper 89-003, Santa Fe Institute, 1989.

[56]
P. Molander. The optimal level of generosity in a selfish, uncertain environment. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 29(4):611-618, 1985.

[57]
U. Mueller. Optimal retaliation for optimal cooperation. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 31:692-724, 1987.

[58]
M. Nowak and K. Sigmund. Oscillations in the evolution of reciprocity. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 137:21-26, 1989.

[59]
M. Nowak and K. Sigmund. The evolution of stochastic strategies in the prisoner's dilemma. Acta Applicandae Mathematicae, 20:247-265, 1990.

[60]
M. Nowak and K. Sigmund. Tit for tat in heterogeneous populations. Nature, 355:250-253, 1992.

[61]
M. Nowak and K. Sigmund. A strategy of win-stay, lose-shift that outperforms tit-for-tat in the prisoner's dilemma game. Nature, 364:56-58, 1993.

[62]
M. Nowak. Stochastic strategies in the prisoner's dilemma. Theoretical Population Biology, 38:93-112, 1990.

[63]
M. Oliphant. Evolving cooperation in the non-iterated prisoner's dilemma. In Brooks and Maes [16], pages 350-352. Artificial Life 4, Cambridge, MA, USA, July 6-8 1994.

[64]
R. Pool. Putting game theory to the test. Science, 267:1591-1593, 1995.

[65]
W. Poundstone. Prisoner's Dilemma : John von Neumann, Game Theory, and the Puzzle of the Bomb. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, 1993.

[66]
A. Rapoport and A. M. Chammah. Prisoner's Dilemma: A Study in Conflict and Cooperation. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, MI, USA, 1965.

[67]
Abdellah Salhi, Hugh Glaser, David De Roure, and John Putney. The prisoner's dilemma revisited. Technical Report DSSE-TR-96-2, University of Southhampton, Department of Electronics and Computer Science, Declarative Systems and Software Engineering Group, Southampton, UK, March 1996.

[68]
Tuomas W. Sandholm and Robert H. Crites. Multiagent reinforcement learning in the iterated prisoner's dilemma. BioSystems, 37(1,2):147-166, 1996. Special Issue, Prisoner's Dilemma.

[69]
Martin Shubik. Game theory, behavior, and the paradox of the prisoner's dilemma: Three solutions. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 14:181-194, 1970.

[70]
Sinervo. Lizards. Nature.

[71]
J. Maynard Smith. The games the lizards play. Nature, 380:198-199, March 1996.

[72]
M. D. Smucker, E. Ann Stanley, and D. Ashlock. Analyzing social network structures in the iterated prisoner's dilemma with choice and refusal. RR. CS-TR-94-1259, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Departement of Computer-Sciences, 1994.

[73]
M. Tomita and T. Kido. Sacrificial acts in single round prisoner's dilemma. Informatica, 18:411-416, 1994.

[74]
V. J. Vanberg and R. D. Congleton. Rationality, morality, and exit. American Political Science Review, 86:418-431, 1992.

[75]
John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern. Theory of Games and Economics Behavior. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, USA, 1944.

[76]
Xin Yao and P. J. Darwen. An experimental study of n-person iterated prisoner's dilemma game. Informatica, 18:435-450, 1994.


[Retour au sommaire]


Copyright © 1998 by LIFL, <prison@lifl.fr>
Last modified: 1998/10/21 - 16:41